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Abstract
The article analyses the development of the military dimension of Russia’s economy 
over the past decade or more, including the significant growth of military expenditure 
and its principal driver, spending on the ambitious state armament programme to 2020. 
For the first time for almost twenty-five years Russia once again possesses capable armed 
forces. With greater economic and military strength Russia’s leadership now feels able 
to be more assertive, even militant, on the world stage. These developments threaten to 
be constrained by the poor performance of the economy, facing the government with 
a policy challenge. However, for Russia and the main Western powers there can be no 
going back to the status quo ante.
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1. Introduction
There is no dispute that present-day Russia is a more assertive power than it 
was a few years ago. This assertiveness and willingness to stand firm in the face of 
Western criticism and sanctions has become especially evident since the onset of 
the crisis and conflict over Ukraine. However, it could be argued that this turn to 
a more assertive, indeed militant, stance began before 2014. Perhaps the Ukraine 
crisis simply served to accentuate a trend of development that was already pre-
sent. This article explores the issue by looking in some detail at the military di-
mension of what can be termed Militant Russia.
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2. The rapid growth of military spending
A good starting point is to explore the changing priority of the military in 
Russia as manifested in the resource commitment to its development, from late 
Soviet times to the present. The exact share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
devoted to the military in the USSR was, and remains, a contested issue, with 
a wide range of estimates, all high by international standards in the post-1945 
world. In the author’s own assessment, by the late 1980s it was approximately 
15% (see Cooper, 1998, p. 246). In the same year the military share of GDP in 
the USA was 5.8% (Deger and Sen, 1991, p. 174). The USSR had a vast defence 
industry employing more than 8 million people (6 million in RSFSR), including 
almost 1.5 million in research and development (R&D) (1.3 million in RSFSR), 
accounting for almost a fifth of total industrial employment. The defence sector 
was granted top priority in resource allocation in the planned economy and its 
personnel enjoyed relatively high monetary, and non-monetary, reward. 
With the collapse of the USSR, communist rule and the planned economy at 
the end of 1991 the situation rapidly changed. With trubled transition to the mar-
ket the Russian economy contracted sharply and the military began to be starved 
of resources and, as a consequence, the defence industry, deprived of orders, be-
gan to shrink, being kept alive mainly by obtaining a few export orders (see 
Cooper, 2013, pp. 98–107). By 1997 military spending was only 4.3% of GDP 
and defence industry employment had fallen to 2.8 million, including 600,000 in 
R&D, i.e. a contraction to less than half its former scale.1 The armed forces, in 
an increasingly demoralised state, received hardly any new weapons. For some 
among the country’s leadership this was a humiliation. True, the former super-
power still retained nuclear weapons, but its conventionally armed forces were 
weak and this gave rise to a deepening sense of insecurity. This sense was height-
ened in 1998 when the already fragile economy experienced a serious financial 
crisis. Output contracted sharply and military spending fell to 3% of GDP. 
With Vladimir Putin as president from May 2000, aided by pro-market re-
forms and rising prices of oil and natural gas, the country’s principal exports, 
the economy revived and there began almost a decade of growth of GDP at an 
annual ave rage rate of almost 7%. Government finances strengthened and it be-
came possible to spend more on defence. However, the government was commit-
ted to macroeconomic stability and the share of spending on the budget chapter 
“national defence”, financing the Ministry of Defence (MOD) armed forces, 
was held stable at approximately 2.5% of GDP. This improved conditions and 
morale in the military but was not enough to fund any meaningful re-equipment 
with new armaments and other military hardware. The country was regaining 
economic strength but militarily was weak, with armed forces attempting to cope 
with increasingly aged weaponry dating back in the main to the 1980s or ear-
lier. A sense of resentment began to mount, a feeling that in less than twenty 
years a once great power had suffered a humiliating loss of strength and influence 
on the world stage. By the mid-2000s there was a growing body of opinion that 
the West was at least partly to blame for this state of affairs, perceived to be acting 
 1 SIPRI military expenditure database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/
milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_database; Cooper (2013, p. 102). 
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as winners of the Cold War, preferring to deal with a weakened Russia. It was this 
sentiment that President Putin voiced in his tough speech at the Munich security 
confe rence in February 2007, when he railed against the “unipolar” world, in 
retrospect a harbinger of Militant Russia. 
It was the brief war with Georgia in August 2008 that convinced Russia’s leader-
ship that reform and re-equipment of the armed forces could no longer be post-
poned. A new civilian defence minister, Anatolii Serdyukov, was appointed, and 
with the full backing of President Dmitrii Medvedev and prime minister Putin, he 
pushed through a set of far-reaching, controversial, but over-due, reforms.2 Prior to 
the onset of the 2008–2009 global financial-economic crisis, a ten-year forecast was 
approved, envisaging economic growth at an annual average rate of approximately 
6%. On the basis of this optimistic scenario, a new state armament programme 
was elaborated for the period 2011 to 2020, signed into action by Medvedev on 
the final day of 2010. It is the implementation of this highly ambitious programme, 
envisioning the spending of 20.7 trillion rubles (at the exchange rate when it was 
 adopted, $680bn) over ten years, that has been the principal driver of the rapid 
growth of military expenditure in Russia over the past five years. 
As shown in Fig. 1, military spending on the armed forces of the MOD has 
increased rapidly as a share of GDP since 2012, from just under 3%, to 3.5% in 
2014 and 4.4% in the 2015, falling back to 4.0% in the 2016 federal budget.
However, this understates the actual volume of military expenditure in Russia. 
In addition to spending on the MOD forces, under other chapters of the budget 
there is spending on the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, the border 
troops of the Federal Security Service, additional spending of the MOD shown 
under a number of budget chapters, including “housing”, “education”, “health”, 
“ social policy”, “culture” and “sport”, and financial support for “closed” cities of 
the MOD and the nuclear weapons industry under the “Rosatom” state corpora-
tion. Total military spending as a share of GDP is shown in Fig. 2.
It can be seen that by 2014 the share had reached 4.5% of GDP, very high by 
international standards, and almost 5.5% in 2015. This puts Russia in a limited 
 2 On the Serdyukov reforms, see Klein (2012) and Renz (2014). 
Fig. 1. Spending on “national defence” as a % of GDP, 2000–2015:  
actual spending, 2000–2015; federal budget, 2016. 
Note: The fall in GDP with the global financial-economic crisis accounts for the spike in 2009. 
Source: Cooper (2015, 2016a).
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group of countries devoting in excess of 5% of GDP to defence. In 2014, accord-
ing to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there were 
only nine such countries, all in Africa and the Middle East. In that year the USA 
allocated 3.5% of GDP, both France and Germany — 2.2% and China — 2.1%. 
However, if Russian military spending is considered in dollar terms, the magni-
tude of the commitment can be seen better in comparative terms. According to 
SIPRI, in current US dollar terms Russia spent $84.5bn on defence, compared 
with the USA $610bn, China $215bn, France $63.3bn and the UK $60.5bn ris-
ing to third largest spender, compared with fifth in 2009.3 However, it should be 
noted that the average 2014 ruble/dollar exchange rate was relatively favourable 
to Russia; with the sharp depreciation of the ruble in late 2014 and 2015 defence 
spending in current dollar terms appears less impressive.4 
As noted above, the principal factor responsible for this rapid increase in spend-
ing has been the re-equipment and modernisation of the armed forces although 
there have also been pay increases and higher spending on training, exercises 
and other aspects of operations and maintenance. The annual stare defence order, 
based on the provisions of the state armament programme, covers the procure-
ment of new armaments and other military hardware, the repair and modernisation 
of  existing armaments, and defence-related R&D. Fig. 3 shows the rapid growth in 
recent years of the share of total spending on “national defence” accounted for by 
the MOD’s annual state defence order.
Notwithstanding mounting economic problems the 60% share envisaged 
in the 2015 budget and the sharp increase over the level of 2014 were in fact 
 realised. This reflects a very determined commitment by the top civil and mili-
tary leadership, in the spirit of Militant Russia, to implement the armament 
programme as fully as possible notwithstanding the economic performance far 
less  favourable than envisaged when the programme was drawn up. Indeed, 
the state of the economy was deteriorating further before the budget was signed 
 3 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/ 
milex_database. 
 4 The average ruble to the dollar exchange rate in 2014 was 38.0; in January–July 2015 — 57.2 (http://www.
eeg.ru/pages/22). 
Fig. 2. Total military spending of Russia as a % of GDP, 2000–2016 federal budget
Source: Cooper (2015, 2016a).
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into law in late 2014. As discussed below, while the 2015 budget was being im-
plemented it became clear to the government that the pace of military modernisa-
tion would have to be moderated. 
3. Rearming Russia
The implementation of the state armament programme to 2020 (hereafter 
GPV-2020) has not been without problems, including disputes over the prices 
of new armaments and delays in the realisation of major new projects, but over 
its first five years secured a significant renewal of the equipment of the armed 
forces. Between 2011 and 2015 the strategic missile forces received approxi-
mately 70 ICBMs, including 58 new “Yars” (RS-24) systems. Two develop-
ment programmes for new systems are proceeding as scheduled, the “Sarmat” 
heavy liquid-fuelled missile and the “Barguzin” rail-based launcher, which will 
carry the “Yars”. The air force and navy obtained almost 330 new fixed wing 
aircraft, including more than 225 combat planes, and over 500 helicopters, in-
cluding approximately 160 Ka-52 and Mi-28N attack helicopters. The air and 
space defence forces received 15-20 division sets of advance S-400 “Triumf” 
air defence systems and several new “Voronezh” radars for the country’s ground 
based missile early warning system. The re-equipment of the ground forces 
was less impressive, to a large extent because efforts were focused on major 
development programmes to create three original “platforms” for a new main 
battle tank (the “Armata”), tracked armoured vehicles (the “Kurganets”) and 
wheeled armoured vehicles (the “Bumerang”). While awaiting these new sys-
tems the ground forces received in the main modernised variants of existing ar-
maments dating back to Soviet times. However, the procurement of one major 
item of equipment, the “Iskander” tactical missile system, is on schedule in ac-
cordance with GPV-2020. The navy has an ambitious renewal programme but its 
implementation has been slower than planned. Three new “Borei” class strategic 
submarines were handed over, each armed with the new “Bulava” missile system, 
one new “Yasen” class multi-role nuclear submarine and three “Varshavyanka” 
diesel-electric submarines. Meanwhile, older strategic submarines have been re-
fitted with the latest “Sineva” and “Lainer” versions of an established, proven 
Fig. 3. Spending on the annual state defence order of the MOD as a % of spending on “national defence”, 
2000–2016 federal budget 
Source: Cooper (2015, 2016a).
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missile. No large surface ships were procured, but the fleet was supplemented 
by three-four new corvettes and two frigates. What would have been Russia’s 
largest purchase of military equipment from abroad, the delivery by France of 
two “Mistral” class helicopter-carrying assault vessels, was hit by NATO and 
EU sanctions and the contract terminated. The goal was to have at least 30% 
modern armaments and other military hardware in the forces by the end of 2015 
and this was exceeded to quite a large degree (Based on Cooper, 2016b). 
However, problems have arisen. The poor state of the economy is leading to 
some reconsideration of priorities, a number of development programmes are run-
ning behind schedule, with rising costs, and, as discussed in the next section, the de-
fence industry is experiencing difficulties arising from a breakdown of military 
supplies from Ukraine and sanctions imposed by NATO and EU member countries. 
4. The impact of the Ukraine crisis and the policy response
The end of military supplies from Ukraine, announced in June 2014, has already 
had an impact on the fulfilment of GPV-2020. With respect to strategic missiles 
and space systems the evidence to date does not indicate any major problems aris-
ing from the breakdown of relations with Ukraine, although Russian specia lists are 
now having to maintain the Soviet-era “Voevoda” (SS-18, “Satan” ) heavy ICBM, 
built in Ukraine and formerly maintained by engineers from Dnepropetrovsk. In 
the aviation industry, the building in Russia of An-140 and An-148 passenger-
transport planes has been curtailed and the ending of delivery of engines for mili-
tary helicopters has reduced the volume of their procurement. Engines for Ka-52 
and Mi-28N combat helicopters are now manufactured in Russia but the volume of 
domestic engine production is not adequate to meet all needs, leading to a sizeable 
reduction in the state defence order for helicopters in 2015. The naval programme 
is also being affected. Both the corvette and frigate programmes are being disrupted 
by the Ukraine crisis, the former by the non-delivery by Germany of diesel power 
units; the latter by the end of deliveries of gas turbines produced in Ukraine. And, 
of course, the sale of the two “Mistral” class assault ships fell victim to sanctions.
In response to Russian actions in Ukraine, the USA and other NATO mem-
ber countries, plus the EU, imposed sanctions intended to strike at Russia’s cur-
rent and future military capability. All arms transfers to Russia were halted; eight 
named corporations of the Russian defence industry were singled out for action 
designed to limit cooperation with Western firms and restrict access to finance 
abroad; and Russia’s access to “dual-use” goods was made more difficult, an ac-
tion reminiscent of the COCOM controls imposed on the USSR during the Cold 
War. Some of the named corporations have experienced limited financial difficul-
ties and been obliged to end joint activities with firms based in sanctioning count-
ries, but these problems do not appear to have had any impact on their work for 
the Russian armed forces or arms exports. Depending on the duration of the sanc-
tion, limitation of access to dual-use technologies could have a significant impact 
in the medium to long term, above all in relation to electronic components and 
advanced production equipment imported for use in the defence industry. There 
is evidence that in expectation that market conditions could become more dif-
ficult enterprises of the radio-electronics industry sharply increased their imports 
in 2014, by 2.6 times to $773 million, probably to boost stocks of components 
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in an attempt to insure against sanctions. The depth of import dependence on 
Russia’s market for radio-electronic products is shown by the industry’s target 
for 2015: to raise the share of domestic production to only 20%, and the share of 
the world market to a mere 0.5%.5 
Import dependence on EU and NATO member countries is especially acute with 
respect to machine tools and other advanced production equipment. According to 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in 2013 88% of the machine tool market was 
taken by imports and the share may be even higher for the defence industry in 
so far as domestic manufacture tends to focus on equipment not at the frontier 
in terms of precision and degree of automation.6 In recent years there have been 
efforts to strengthen the domestic production capability in machine tools and tool-
ing. The state corporation “Rostekh” now has control of “Stankoprom” holding 
company, created in 2013, uniting eight of the country’s leading producers and 
charged by the government with being the systems integrator for the entire Russian 
machine tool industry.7 It has an orientation to securing the needs of the defence 
industry. However, the modernisation policy entailing in part the creation of joint 
ventures with foreign partners with sanctions may now be under threat. 
The Russian response has been rapid and determined, a concerted drive to se-
cure self-sufficiency by a programme of domestic import substitution and switch-
ing to suppliers considered fully dependable, above all in Belarus and other CIS 
countries, plus manufacturers in China and other Asian economies. The aim is to 
minimise Russia’s exposure to any future sanctions as rapidly as possible. The pro-
gramme of import substitution in relation to Ukraine, valued at c. 50bn rubles , 
was approved by Putin in July 2014. It is a detailed, classified, schedule of import 
substitution activities over a period lasting to 2018. The programme will be part-
funded from the federal budget but a large proportion of the measures will be 
realised from the resources of enterprises (Barabanov, 2015). It has been claimed 
that the programme covers more than 3,000 components and systems, produced 
by over 160 Ukrainian enterprises, entering into more than 200 models of arma-
ments, military and special hardware.8 
A programme of import substitution measures in response to Western sanctions 
affecting the defence sector was signed off by the President in January 2015.9 Its 
cost has not been revealed. According to deputy prime minister Dmitrii Rogozin, 
there are 640 models of armaments and military hardware dependent on com-
ponent imports from NATO and EU countries and the intention is to substitute 
the inputs for 571 of them by 2018.10 Some positions, he acknowledges, will be 
difficult to cover, in particular radiation-resistant electronic components for space 
use and the nuclear industry, and this would take longer.11 
Clearly, not all inputs currently obtained from NATO and EU member countries 
will be manufactured in Russia. In some cases, notably for electronic components, 
 5 http://instel.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Решение-расширенного-совещания-РЭП-2015-г..pdf.
 6 http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/activities/industry/otrasli/stankostroi/. Import dependence is probably even more 
pronounced for control systems for numerically controlled machine tools.
 7 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2633606.
 8 http://izvestia.ru/news/574998.
 9 http://www.ng.ru/armies/2015-01-22/2_sanktsii.html.
 10 http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=381547. 
 11 http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150529/1067144746.html (Rogozin at Vladimir economic forum). 
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they can be imported from Belarus and Asian economies. In August 2014 it was 
reported that over the next two-three years while domestic production is being 
organized on an import substitution basis, China would play a significant role as 
a source of military and space specification electronic components, with annual 
imports of at least $1bn, replacing much of the $2bn a year previously obtained 
from the USA.12 Also in relation to electronic components there is the issue of re-
defining what constitutes a “domestic producer” to include some Russian-owned 
companies abroad and foreign manufacturing facilities working to Russian de-
signs. In the case of production equipment, some can be obtained from China and 
other non-NATO/EU countries but developing a stronger domestic industry will 
be difficult without joint ventures with leading world producers. One limiting fac-
tor which threatens to make difficult the early realization of import substitution 
in the machine tool industry is an acute shortage of highly trained, experienced, 
engineering personnel and shop floor workers (see Kapustin, 2015).
It remains to be seen how these ambitious import substitution programmes will 
be realised. For the defence industry the sudden turn to a policy of import substi-
tution represents an abrupt reversal of what was becoming a cautious, but steady, 
move towards more active participation in global defence and high technology net-
works, an internationalization of a formerly rather closed system. It was believed 
that this path offered a route towards greater efficiency and competitiveness. There 
are now fears that the turn to self-reliance, especially if pursued in a politicized, 
campaign-like, manner, could have negative outcomes (see, e.g. Sinitskiy, 2015).
5. Economic constraints beginning limit plans
In the course of 2014 and 2015, with a depressed global economy, the perfor-
mance of the Russian economy deteriorated under the impact of declining prices 
for oil and gas, a depreciating currency, inflation, high interest rates, a declining 
rate of investment and underlying structural problems, not addressed adequately 
by the government over a number of years. At the same time, the economy was 
experiencing difficulties created by Western sanctions and the Russian counter-
measures, namely banning imports of agricultural products and foodstuffs from 
sanctioning countries. With an increasingly strained budget situation, it began to 
be recognised that the growth of military expenditure would have to be mode-
rated. In particular, it was decided to delay the adoption of a new armaments 
programme to 2025, originally scheduled to begin in January 2016, to 2018. In 
the meantime, efforts will be focused on the implementation of the current pro-
g ramme to 2020 and the realisation of import substitution programmes. While 
spending on the armament programme was retained at the 2015 level by resort 
to additional state guaranteed credits, spending on “national defence” declined 
from 4.3% of GDP in 2015 to 4.0% in 2016 (Cooper, 2016a). It is possible that 
the mili tary and defence industry interests will lobby successfully for some pro-
tection when the budget is amended later in the year but it will probably remain 
the case that the year 2015 will stand out as an exceptional peak of resource com-
mitment to boosting the country’s defences. 
 12 http://izvestia.ru/news/574886. This will involve close cooperation with the China Aerospace Science and 
Industry Corp, CASIC. 
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6. Pivot to the East
Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis there has been a rapid development 
of closer military relations with China and other Asian powers. This is part of 
general “turn to the East” as Russia weakens relations with the United States, 
the European Union and other NATO member countries. It is China that has 
been the main focus of attention, as a rapidly rising global power committed, 
like Russia, to the development of a more clearly expressed multi-polar interna-
tional order. Like Russia, China faces attempts by the United States to contain 
its growing military potential. It also offers increasing possibilities for industrial 
cooperation as China’s scientific and technological capabilities match and in 
some sectors, notably in electronics, outstrip those of Russia. 
The closeness of military relations was demonstrated in May 2015 when 
President Xi Jinping was guest of honour at Russia’s commemoration of the 70th 
anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany and sat next to Putin during the 9 May 
2015 military parade, in which a contingent of Chinese troops participated. This 
was reciprocated in September when Putin was guest of honour at China’s mili-
tary parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Japan.
In the 1990s and early 2000s China was one of Russia’s largest customers 
for armaments. Over time, however, China’s own industrial capability matured 
to a significant degree and orders began to decline. Increasingly, China sought 
Russia’s latest, most advanced, weapons but Russia was unwilling to sell as it was 
feared that they would be copied, leading to the appearance later on the global 
arms market of Chinese clones at lower prices than the original Russian models. 
With improved relations this situation began to change: Russia has agreed in 
principle to sell China two of its most modern weapons, the  Su-35S fighter and 
the S-400 air defence system. Talks on the former began in 2012 but progress 
was delayed by Russian concerns relating to intellectual property rights, under-
standable as there is a long history of Chinese “borrowing” of Russian aviation 
technology, but in the summer of 2015 Rosoboroneksport indicated a contract 
for the delivery of 24 Su-35s was likely to be signed before the end of the year.13 
A contract for the supply of the S-400 has yet to be concluded. Again there are 
copyright fears but on the Russian side also capacity constraints. Domestic pro-
curement of the S-400 has first priority and it is unlikely that China will obtain 
the system before 2020 at the earliest. Russia and China have also agreed to de-
velop jointly a new heavy-lift helicopter and China is also interested in acquiring 
the RD-180 rocket engine for use in space launchers.14
In May 2015 Russia and China conducted joint naval exercises in the Medi-
terranean and in August in the Far East, involving vessels of the Russia Far East 
Fleet and seven ships of the Chinese navy, including a destroyer.15 It is likely that 
more joint military exercises will follow. However, while a full military alliance 
is not a serious possibility, a pragmatic military partnership of symbolic impor-
tance as much as a link promoting real military effectiveness should not be ruled 
out. For Russia it is a manifestation of the long-sought multi-polarity of the post-
 13 http://vpk.name/news/134206_rossiya_nadeetsya_podpisat_s_kitaem_kontrakt_po_su35_do_konca_goda.html.
 14 http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150825/1206503956.html.
 15 http://ria.ru/analytics/20150820/1197434790.html. 
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Cold War worlds; for China it improves access to military technologies not yet 
possessed and provides some tactical benefits at a time when the United States is 
seeking more overtly to contain the country’s rising military power. 
China is far from being the only Eastern power with which Russia has military 
relations. To the fore, by scale of deliveries, 2010-14, were India, China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mongolia, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Laos. Overall, during the same period, Asian countries accounted for 64% of all 
Russian arms exports.16 In the case of India, there is also joint activity in arms 
development and production, notably cooperation in the development of a fifth 
generation fighter and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.17 
Another developing forum of Russian and Chinese cooperation in security 
matters is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), created in 2001. This 
is not yet a Eurasian counterpart of NATO but its membership is steadily ex-
panding and there is little doubt that its leaders regard it at least in part as a re-
sponse to a perceived US and Western hegemony in military and security mat-
ters. In 2015, when it held a summit in Ufa, to the core membership of China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan it was decided to in-
vite India and Pakistan, both currently with observer status, probably in 2016.18 
Belarus is to be granted observer status and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia 
and Nepal will become new “partners in dialogue”.19 The longer-term inten-
tions of Russia and China with respect to the SCO are not entirely clear but 
some members are opposed to it becoming a tighter military grouping, in par-
ticular Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, who in Ufa said it is necessary 
“to rule out any kind of bloc mentality and not turn the SCO into a military and 
political alliance.”20 Rather than direct military cooperation, the most developed 
security work of the SCO is in the field of counter terrorism, through Regional 
Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), based in Tashkent. A major concern of the SCO 
is now the regional security situation  following the US and NATO withdrawal 
from Afghanistan. At the Ufa summit Putin made it clear that Russia considered 
the NATO involvement in Afghanistan a far from positive experience. To some 
extent, the SCO provides a forum for the expression of sentiments in the spirit 
of Militant Russia. 
7. New priority for the Arctic
As Russia’s military capability strengthens, the Arctic is increasingly becom-
ing a focus of attention. This is clearly a long-term commitment but is being 
treated as a matter of some urgency and represents a new phase of Russia’s evolv-
ing policy for the Far North and the Arctic.21 As global warming makes the north-
ern route increasingly navigable and hydrocarbons extraction moves northward, 
 16 Calculated from the arms transfers database of SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 
 17 On the BrahMos, see http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/index-445.html. 
 18 Iran and Mongolia are observer members, Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey “partners in dialogue”. http://
www.infoshos.ru/en/. Iran applied for full membership in 2008 but according to the rules of the SCO a country 
subject to UN sanctions cannot become a full member. 
 19 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-putin-shanghai-cooperation-organization-summit-brics-ufa/27120442.
html (After BRICS, Putin Hosts Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Ufa). 
 20 Ibid. As it happens, the next SCO summit will be held in Tashkent in September 2016.
 21 For an overview of policy, see Laruelle (2013).
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Russia seems determined to defend its territorial interests in the expectation that 
national rivalries in the Arctic will become more acute. 
In December 2014 a new Arctic joint command “Sever” was formed, with 
headquarters in Murmansk. This new command will also have at its disposal, 
when necessary, forces in the Eastern and Central Military Districts.22 Much 
new military infrastructure is being built in the Arctic, including a number of 
air fields, scheduled for completion by the end of 2015. There can be no sur-
prise that the Arctic figures prominently in the new version of Russia’s maritime 
doctrine that was signed into operation by President Putin in late July 2015.23 
The importance of military and security issues in Russia’s policy for the north is 
underlined by the fact that the chair of the newly formed State Commission for 
the Development of the Arctic is the tough deputy prime minister, deputy chair 
of the Military-Industrial Commission, Dmitrii Rogozin. The need for a single 
centre of responsibility for Arctic policy was proposed by President Putin at 
a meeting of the Security Council in April 2014 and later in the year he spoke 
of the need to strengthen the defences of the Arctic without its militarisation.24 
There is no doubt that from now on Russia will be a highly assertive power in 
all matters concerning the development of the Far North and the necessity for its 
effective defence. 
This more assertive military stance in the north is matched by a less evi-
dent but real process of building up the capability in the south, partly through 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (ODKB), which is devoting increas-
ing attention to the level of equipment of the forces of the countries involved 
and focusing on Central Asia, concerned that the withdrawal of US and other 
troops from Afghanistan will  create security threats to Russia’s south. In August 
2015, with the aim of strengthening Russia’s engagement with the ODKB, Putin 
decreed the formation of an inter-agency working group, the ten government de-
partments involved including the MOD, FSB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation.25
8. Preparing to defend the country
A significant manifestation of the new assertiveness of Russia is not only the se-
rious efforts to enhance the country’s military capability but also the concern to 
ensure that the nation could respond rapidly and decisively in the event of any 
external aggression. The Ukraine crisis and the response of the West to the an-
nexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine have generated an enhanced 
sense of vulnerability to potentially hostile acts, with the United States perceived 
as the principal source of danger. Indeed, there are many in Russia who regard 
the Ukraine conflict as a new form of proxy war, with a belief that US support 
for Kiev and Ukrainian military action in the East against separatists amounts 
to indirect US aggression against Russia. Some go as far as to claim that a new 
world war has actually started, taking new forms, aggression being pursued not 
 22 http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/07/26/rossiya-narashhivaet-voennuyu-gruppirovku-v-arktike.html.
 23 http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060; http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/uAFi5n-
vux2twaqjftS5yrIZUVTJan77L.pdf (The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation).
 24 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2661252.
 25 http://www.rg.ru/2015/08/22/odkb-site-anons.html.
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only through military action, but also by information warfare, sanctions and other 
economic measures, politics and diplomacy, all amounting to a comprehensive 
“hybrid” war of a new 21st century nature (Examples include Bartosh, 2015). 
This view is held in conservative, nationalist, and security-orientated circles, no-
tably by adherents of the Izborskii Club, including such figures as Presidential 
advisor on Eurasian integration, Sergei Glaziev, retired military leader, Leonid 
Ivashov, Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor of the weekly Zavtra, and the ideologist of 
neo-Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin.26 From the outset, the Izborskii Club, formed 
in 2012, has taken the view that a major new global conflict is almost inevitable, 
with Russia the principal target of aggression. In their view, it is imperative that 
Russia adopts a “great breakthrough” strategy, a mobilisation project, to prepare 
the country for this “highly probable” great war, forecast, in their manifesto of 
October 2012, to occur within 7–10 years (Averiyanov et al., 2013, p. 51).27 While 
this may be the view of an ideologically committed minority, the belief that Russia 
must be better prepared for possible external aggression appears to be widely held 
in military and security circles. 
This perception of Russia being the potential victim of aggression has been 
heightened by military developments in the West, in particular discussion in 
the USA of a so-called Prompt Global Strike, efforts to develop a capability to 
deliver a precision-guided conventional airstrike anywhere in the world within 
one hour. This development has been followed very closely in Russia and some 
recent arms procurement decisions have clearly been influenced by it. For Russia 
it is to be countered by upgrading the country’s nuclear capability, in particu-
lar by the development of the new heavy multiple-warhead “Sarmat” ICBM and 
the rail-based “Barguzin” missile system, the future deployment of the S-500 air 
and space defence system, and by improving the military’s missile early warning 
capability and reducing the response time in the event of any perceived attack. 
In addition, serious efforts have been made to enhance the central coordination 
of the armed forces and secure a more rapid, concerted, response in the event of 
armed conflict. 
9. The National Defense Management Center 
One significant manifestation of this concern to improve the country’s ability 
to respond to external threats is the creation in less than a year, as a matter of 
highest state priority, of the National Defense Management Center of the Russian 
Federation (known in Russian as NTsUO). Part of the MOD’s complex on 
the Frunze Embankment, its total cost was reported to be almost 40bn rubles, at 
the time equivalent to $US 1.2bn.28
The NTsUO does not yet exist in a developed working form and the full net-
worked, inter-agency, coordination remains an aspiration. According to one 
 26 Thus Dugin, in August 2014, “...it is necessary to acknowledge the fact: in reality we find ourselves in a state 
of war with the USA and countries of NATO”. http://vk.com/duginag?w=wall18631635_3638. For Glaziev, 
a fourth world war is already underway (the third being the Cold War), with Russia as the principal target, 
the United States striving to retain it global dominance (Glaziev, 2015, pp. 12–13). But this is a “hybrid war”, 
not a full military assault. http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/6818/.
 27 However, an introductory article gives a timescale of 5–7 years (p. 39). 
 28 http://www.trud.ru/index.php/article/21-01-2014/1306228_takimi_kamnjami_ne_brosajutsja.html.
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author , the technical facilities of the NTs will “in future” permit the obtaining of 
information in real time from all parts of the country.29 Nevertheless, the creation 
of the NTsUO is a significant development, tending to confirm that after almost 
twenty-five years of reduced state priority and under-funding Russia once again 
possesses a military capability meriting respect. The Moscow centre is now at 
the heart of an expanding network of defence management centres being  created in 
each of the country’s military districts and in major territorial subdivisions within 
them. There is now a Central regional TsUO in Ekaterinburg cove ring twenty-
nine subjects of the Federation plus Russian military garrisons in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a Southern regional centre in Rostov-on-Don, and an 
Eastern centre in Khabarovsk. Territorial centres are also being established, early 
examples include those of Samara and Novosibirsk.30 The intention is to create 
a nation-wide real-time information system covering all aspects to the country’s 
defence, with the National NTsUO as its central point. Given the vulnerable loca-
tion of the NTs in central Moscow, it cannot be ruled out that there is also a secret 
reserve centre for use in the event of a major conflict. 
Enhancing the preparedness of the armed forces has clearly been the motivat-
ing factor behind the series of military exercises, many at short notice, that have 
become a feature of life in Russia in recent times. Some have been on a very 
large scale, such as “Vostok-2014” involving a reported 100,000 troops, but most 
on a regional or local scale involving a limited number of troops. In 2014 a total 
of more than 3,500 exercises took place.31 All service arms have been involved, 
often engaged in joint operations. Improved funding of the forces has made pos-
sible more active training programmes and more extensive outreach to an extent 
that has generated concern in the West, especially when strategic bombers and 
advanced combat aircraft have been involved. In turn, this activity has prompted 
NATO exercises on mounting scale (see Kearns et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b). This 
situation has led to interest in establishing agreed security-enhancing procedures 
for regulating military exercises and reducing the danger of serious, perhaps very 
dangerous, incidents (see, in particular, ELN, 2015). 
10.  A “threatening period” — mobilising in the expectation that worse 
could follow
With the annexation of Crimea and ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia 
has clearly been in a state of heightened military readiness, exemplified by a suc-
cession of surprise military exercises, frequent probing flights near European 
coasts and to the USA by strategic bombers and other aircraft, the very rapid 
building and inauguration of the NTsUO, and the active engagement by President 
Putin in military affairs, with many meetings on arms procurement and other 
defence matters. This level of activity suggests that over the past year Russia has 
been effectively at an early stage of its well-established (in Soviet times) proce-
dure of “mobilisation”. This is another manifestation of Militant Russia.
 29 http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/27/grandioznyy-pereezd-minoborony-vse-idet-po-planu.html. 
 30 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2635458;  http://topwar.ru/64895-yuzhnyy-regionalnyy-centr-upravleniya-
oboronoy-rossii-zastupil-na-boevoe-dezhurstvo.html;   http://baikalfinans.com/lichnyie-dengi/regionalnyiy-tsentr- 
upravleniya-oboronoy-vvo-povyisil-effektivnost-upravleniya-voyskami.html.
 31 http://top.rbc.ru/politics/07/09/2015/55ed3abc9a7947b38cbede6c.
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The Russian system of preparing for war and mobilisation of the economy is 
based on that of the USSR. In a “threatening (ugroshaemyi) period” when armed 
conflict could appear state agencies are primed to take action and begin to under-
take military, economic, diplomatic and informational measures. If the war dan-
ger increases a so-called “special (osobyi) period” is notified. During the “special 
period” steps are taken to mobilise the economy and state institutions so that 
the country is prepared fully for a declaration of war.
This heightened concern with mobilisation is not new, it predates the Ukraine 
conflict. In 2010 a “Concept of improving the mobilisation preparation of 
the Russian economy in present-day conditions” was adopted.32 In the following 
year work began on preparing a new Mobilisation Plan, which as in Soviet times, 
is done every five years.33 Economic aspects of mobilisation are the respon sibility 
of the Military-Industrial Commission, since September 2014 year chaired by 
Putin. The preparation of control bunkers and other infrastructure for running 
the country in the event of war is vested with the Main Directorate of Special 
Programmes (GUSP), the most secretive of all government agencies. Reserve 
stocks of food, medicines, materials and equipment held for emergencies and war 
are managed by the Federal Agency for State Reserves, another secretive body. 
A new feature of this preparation for a possible conflict is that it is now under-
taken within the framework of the Plan of Defence. 
According to Valerii Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the armed forces , 
a new statute of the Staff was adopted in June 2013, intended to enhance its role 
in coordinating the work of all federal agencies of executive power in securing 
the country’s defence.34 Clearly, the Plan of Defence, also specified in the statute , 
is one of the instruments for implementing this responsibility. The first such Plan 
was signed off by Putin in January 2013.35 The Plan sets out the tasks of 52 federal 
agencies plus three state corporations in the field of defence in both peace time 
and war.36 Details are not available, but according to Gerasimov it specified 
the measures and resources required to “secure in good time the preparation of 
the country for transition to wartime conditions.”37 A new version of the Plan, for 
the years 2016 to 2020, was signed off by President Putin in November 2015.38 
The new NTs can be seen as a logical development of the new role of the General 
Staff in securing an enhanced, more effective, level of coordination. According to 
Gerasimov, the need for such timely coordination has become pressing because 
of changes in the international situation. Conflicts now develop with great rapidi-
ty and involve the use of both military and non-military means, and “the reaction 
time for transition from political and diplomatic measures to the application of 
military force has been reduced to the maximum.”39 
 32 http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/9146/ (Sergei Ivanov on the draft Concept, 27 January 2010).
 33 http://top.rbc.ru/economics/14/01/2014/899309.shtml.
 34 Speech at the annual meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences (VPK, 5 February 2014. http://vpk-news.
ru/articles/18998). For new statute of the General Staff, see The Decree of the President of RF, 23 July 2013, 
No. 631 (http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70319514/). 
 35 http://www.kremlin.ru/news/17385 (meeting of Shoigu with Putin for approval of the plan, 29 January 
2013).
 36 http://www.kp.ru/daily/26302/3181011/. 
 37 Speech at the annual meeting, loc. cit.
 38 http://rg.ru/2015/11/17/plan-site-anons.html.
 39 Speech at the annual meeting, loc. cit.
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In 2013 the government adopted eight classified decrees setting out the new 
regime of mobilisation preparation as applied to various sectors of the economy, 
including the defence industry, production for medical purposes, electric power , 
transport, communications and agricultural products and food. The number of 
organisations required to make preparations was reduced sharply compared 
with earlier practice. A new mobilisation plan for the economy was adopted 
for the year 2014, the date of approval of this secret document has not been re-
vealed. According to Sergei Khutortsev, director of the government’s department 
for securing the activities of the Military-Industrial Commission, the mobilisa-
tion plan, described as the “military-economic basis for the Plan of Defence” 
of the country, sets out measures to guarantee meeting the needs of the armed 
forces , the state and population in the event of war. He observes that in elaborat-
ing the plan the necessity of securing the technological independence of Russia in 
the production of strategic and other armaments is taken into account. Reference 
is also made to the necessity of delivering agricultural produce and foods by do-
mestic producers (Khutortsev, 2013). This hints that even before the Ukraine cri-
sis there were pressures for a greater degree of self-sufficiency in the interests of 
safeguarding the country’s national security. 
In early September 2015 Putin ordered a surprise exercise of the forces of 
the Central military district. But this was more than a test of the readiness of 
the armed forces, it also involved aspects of the mobilisation system, including 
GUSP, Rosrezerv and five government departments, including the ministries of 
health and agriculture. According to Shoigu, the aim was to check “their readi-
ness for fulfilling tasks in conditions of wartime.”40 The message is clear: foreign 
powers should not be in any doubt, Russia is ready and determined to defend itself. 
11.  And the public view?
A central feature of Militant Russia is the unity of views on basic issues of 
the country’s leadership and a sizeable proportion of the population. This certain-
ly appears to be the case with respect to military and security policy. According 
to a July 2015 poll by the respected Levada Centre, 53% of those surveyed agreed 
with the statement, “we must spend more on defence even if it causes some prob-
lems for our economic development”, compared with 34% who disagreed. In 
May 1998 the balance of opinion was the reverse: 53% opposed, 35% agreed.41 
Is there a perception that the country now has a stronger, more capable, military? 
A VTsIOM poll, also in July 2015, asked whether it was believed that Russia’s 
military would be capable to defending the country in the event of military threats 
from other countries. No less than 86% said “yes”, only10% “no”. This compares 
with 67/27% in 2007 and 60/33% in 2005.42 There is more opinion poll evi-
dence of a similar nature, leaving little doubt that there is broad public support for 
the policy of strengthening the armed forces and the government’s commitment 
to increased military spending. 
 40 http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12055103@egNews.
 41 http://www.levada.ru/21-07-2015/ekonomika-i-oborona. In 2015 “don’t knows” were 14%; in 1998 13%. 
 42 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115308 (VTsIOM — Russian Public Opinion Research Centre). 
Whereas only 20% of those asked would want their brother, son, husband or other close relative to serve in 
the armed forces in 2002, by July 2015 the share had risen to 59%. 
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12.  What does it all mean?
There are clearly longer-term processes in play that help explain enhanced 
defence and security concerns in Russia from at least the mid-2000s. A percep-
tion in leadership circles that the country was being sidelined and contained 
by the United States and other Western powers steadily gained ground, lead-
ing to the evolution of Militant Russia. However, the Ukraine crisis has served 
to accele rate and intensify the processes already underway. After a dramatic 
weakening of Russia’s economic and military might over 10–15 years from 
the collapse of communism and the USSR, and a consequential diminution of 
the former super power’s role in world affairs, the country is back on track to 
becoming once again not only a strong regional power, but also a weighty actor 
on the global stage. This newly acquired military capability was demonstrated to 
the world in unambiguous terms by Russia’s intervention in Syria. With greater 
economic and military strength Russia’s leadership now feels able to be more as-
sertive, expecting other major powers to acknowledge and respect the country’s 
interests and concerns. 
The eventual settlement of the Ukraine crisis may cool the rhetoric and permit 
a rebuilding of relationships. But there can be no return to the status quo ante. 
Militant Russia is here to stay. The US, EU and other powers, including the UK, 
will have little choice, regardless of current attitudes towards Putin and the re-
gime, but to work towards a new modus vivendi with a stronger, more assertive 
and demanding Russia, now with a revitalised military capability. 
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